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ARGUMENT 
I. 
MICHELEX PROPERLY PRESERVED ITS CLAIMS THAT THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO HOLD A HEARING TO 
DETERMINE IF MICHELEX WAS A DEBTOR OR A PARTNER 
DEPRIVED MICHELEX'S DUE PROCESS. 
Cadleway fails to show that Michelex failed to timely appeal the Minute Entry and 
preserved its argument of deprivation of its due process. 
A. Michelex Acted Timely To Appeal The District Court's Minute Entry 
Ruling On Michelex's Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment. 
Cadleway's assertion that Michelex failed to properly follow the appellate 
procedures to appeal the district court's Order and Judgment is misleading because 
Michelex is not appealing the Order and Judgment Against Garnishee Michelex 
Corporation and Michelex Audio Corporation of America AKA Michelex Corporation, 
dated January 16, 2009 ("Order and Judgment"). (R. at 255). Michelex is appealing the 
district court's Minute Entry denying Michelex's Motion to Set Aside the Order and 
Judgment entered January 16, 2009. (R. at 318). See Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shettler, 
768 P.2d 950, 970 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (A ruling on a Rule 60(b) Motion is a separate 
appealable order.). 
Michelex's strict adherence to the proper appellate procedure cannot, and has not 
been, controverted. Cadleway makes no argument that Michelex failed to comply with 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in cippealing the Minute Entry (R. at 18-325) and 
Michelex complied with the appellate rules and preserved the issues correctly before the 
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• district court. I lie | n cser\ at a m i» . |i nreinent is found in rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Pi < >cedure, whicl 1 provides, in relevant part, "that for each I^ SIK --- -a i 
appeal, an appellant's brief must include a "citatiott •* *• -a ma at the issue 
was preserved in the trial court: an ,» slaleituiti of grounds for seeking review of an issue 
not presen eel in \\w in il
 (, i.-a i UTAHR. APP. P. 24(a)(5)(A)-(B). To preserve an issue 
ui, the appellant must have raised "a timely and specific objeef am befnr. »lu: 
trial court. State v. Low, 2008 TTT 0',. IJ I / l-a I n\ Nn Main lev did raise a timely 
objection and hi K - a ,, r<^a UN preserving the issues for appeal. (R. at 
172,2! ], M)l). 
Cadleway admits that Michelex's second argument (Aiyumuil 111 is dedicated to 
the district court's determination noi 10 \et a'ade ilia del ,uli judgment under rule 60(b). 
However, l. adieu a\ suggesh M.,.I Michelex is attempting to appeal the district court's 
l )\\\cv and hutment with its deprivation of due process claim, because in it- ^ < ! •• s 
Brief, Michelex claims that its due process rights wmilil 11;t\ a hi vn preserved if an 
evidentiary or a R sue *« •. 11 held before signing the default 
judgment. .Sec AppeilaA » Brief at 7-8. That is simply untrue. Michelex has been timely 
uii. pecific in its requests and arguments regarding its appeal and piesu\ IIIL- Hie issues. 
Michelex was timely in filing its Motion la Se( Aside ' M'du and Judgment Against 
Garnishee Michelex < * M p. n -a .an ,„ ,i„, i, ( l\ I lehelex Audio Corporation of America. AKA 
IVl ii hek; \ < 'orp - i, and Request for Hearing ("Motion") (R. at 0 1 n anu i- o '' 
Memorandum of Garnishee iii Support of Its Motion In Sei A aik idgment 
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Against Garnishee Michelex Corporation and Michelex Audio Corporation of America, 
AKA Michelex Corporation ("Reply Memorandum") (R. at 307). If Michelex wanted to 
appeal the Order and Judgment, it would have so acted. Michelex's appeal of the Minute 
Entry is not a uback door" to appeal the findings of the Order and Judgment, as suggested 
by Cadleway. Michelex filed its Motion well within the 30-day limit to file its Notice of 
Appeal. Michelex seeks only to address the narrow issue of the propriety of the denial of 
relief from the district court's Order and Judgment as it violated Michelex's due process, 
not the Order and Judgment itself. See Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 
UTApp HOf 19,2 P.3d 451. 
Michelex's recitation of the facts and arguments made in its Appellant's Brief of 
the matter below with the district court, the parties and the garnishee, simply provides the 
context of the deprivation of Michelex's due process due to the district court's refusal to 
set aside its Minute Entry and hold an evidentiary hearing with Cadleway and Michelex. 
Michelex is generally seeking that this Court reverse the Minute Entry and remand the 
matter for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the information Michelex submitted in 
its Answers to the Garnishment Interrogatories and the Gramuglia and Almasian 
Affidavits are true, or if the conflicting information proffered as evidence by Cadleway to 
the district court were true. 
In Michelex's first argument, Michelex is asking this Court to find that its due 
process rights were violated in that a taking occurred without due process of law and the 
district court erred in not setting aside its Order and Judgment and conducting an 
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evidentiary hearing. I 'his partieukii nutdi presents some unique factors, the principal of 
v\ hieh i1, ili.il Mielielex is a Garnishee and not a party to the original suit As a garnishee 
Michelex is afforded a heightened sensitivity to due process. Pangea Icchiioii-gics. Inc. s 
Internet Promotions, Inc., 2( • p *d 23 7. Michelex does not seek 
to challenge lln, induim, II( owed to Cadleway or seek to challenge the OSC or 
• • " V\ arrant. Michelex strictly seeks to have an evidentiary hearing to tiisuie lis nt'lils 
relative to the potential taking set forth in UK ;ruci 
R. Michelex Preserved The Issue of Deprivation of Due Process By Raising 
the Issue Before The District Court. 
< iitlteway fails to persuasively argue or establish that this Court does not 
jurisdiction to consider both of the issues Michelex is appen a ^ efficiently 
raised the issues, including its depi i\ .nun "H din.' pi< ss,:s * it is now appealing to this 
Court. "| a | titai f IT is si i \Yu leni iy raised if it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is 
afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue." Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm n. 
P.2d 125, 129-130 (Utah Ct. App. ! W, HoUiiHi omilh .1) 
Michelex preserved the issue <>l dei>> IN alion oi due process in its pleadings filed 
vui11 1111 -Iis(i it i siii Importantly, the district court responded to Michelex's due 
process issue in its Minute Entry. Michelex admits that ne w: l ui t 
used the term "deprivation of due pi.... ess, 1 lowe\ IT lite issue of Michelex's due 
process, Michelex"- wi ipertv williouL due process of law, was raised in 
-v ••••' •' dri , 'njiovv. vK- a , i ( I, 213-214. and 308-31.2). The judgment against, jiiit 'hi 
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seizure of property from, a Garnishee (a stranger to the principal case), imposes unique 
due process consideration, including a need for heightened sensitivity. See Pangea, 2004, 
UT 40, fflf 6 and 10; UTAH R. CIV. P. 64D. Michelex's Objection (R. at 172), Motion (R. 
at 211) and Reply Memorandum (R. at 307) were timely, specific and sufficiently raised 
and preserved for appeal the issue of due process. The Objection, Motion and Reply 
Memo described the issue and stated the facts of Michelex's deprivation of due process. 
Michelex's pleadings provided the district court the required opportunity to remedy the 
defects, it simply refused to so act. Michelex, in its pleadings raised the issue of its 
deprivation of its due process with the court-subscribed taking without notice and due 
process of law, affording Michelex an opportunity to present evidence and controvert 
information presented by Cadleway. 
The Proposed Judgment, if entered will be in the nature of default 
judgment, Garnishee having not participated in the December 12, 2008 
hearing and having not submitted any evidence in opposition to the 
Plaintiffs claims. Garnishee clearly has good faith defenses to Plaintiffs 
claims against Garnishee and, if allowed to assert the same would likely 
prevail against the Plaintiffs asserted judgment. 
(R. at 174, 213-214). 
It should be remembered that the Order which is hereby sought to be set 
aside was entered on January 20, 2009, awarding Judgment against 
Garnishee in the substantial amount of $803,031.31, based not upon any 
factual allegations or claim set forth in a Complaint, but solely upon 
Garnishee's alleged failure to Answer Garnishment Interrogatories 
concerning any amounts owning [sic] to the Envelope Packaging fo Utah, a 
party against whom judgment had been entered based upon a fully litigated 
contract claim. 
(R. at 308). 
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First, it is crucial to recognize that the Motion and the previously filed 
Objection have been made on the grounds that the factual basis for the 
Judgment entered against Garnishee is false and inaccurate, Garnishee 
having heretofore fully responded to the Writs of Garnishment and 
answered the interrogatories propounded to Garnishee under oath, 
evidencing that Garnishee owed no money or property to Plaintiff. 
(R. at 309). 
The Order and Judgment, unless set aside will have been entered in the 
nature of default judgment, Garnishee having not participated in the 
December 12, 2008 hearing and having not submitted any evidence in 
opposition to the Plaintiffs claims. 
(R. at 310). 
The district court responded to Michelex's arguments regarding its due process 
rights. The district court's response in its Minute Entry demonstrates it had an 
opportunity to address and correct the issue. Instead, the district court chose not to 
correct the deprivation of the Michelex's due process by holding an evidentiary or Rule 
64(D) hearing, but to refer to Michelex's notice of the OSC and Bench Warrant and its 
failure to appear to address why it had allegedly failed to prepare and mail the Answers to 
the Garnishment Interrogatories. 
Michelex had ample notice of the proceedings before this Court and the 
consequences of failing to appear or in any other way communicate with the 
Court. However, it disregarded the notices assuming that its alleged single 
response relieved it from any further obligation to respond. 
(R. at 323). 
Michelex's assertions in its three pleadings raised the issue of the deprivation of its 
due process, presented to the district court Michelex's constitutional challenge and 
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provided the court with the requisite opportunity to consider and rule on that issue. 
Michelex's due process rights were compromised when the district court refused to set 
aside its Order and Judgment and conduct an evidentiary or Rule 64(D) before it allowed 
a taking of Michelex by Cadleway. The district court addressed the issue, but failed to 
appropriately decide it. See Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129-130 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citkion omitted) ("[a] matter is sufficiently raised if it is submitted 
to the trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue."). 
C. Michelex Arguments Prevail On The Merits. 
Cadleway asserts that the case Pangea Technologies, Inc. v. Internet Promotions, 
Inc., 2004 UT 40, 94 P.3d 257, is inapposite, lending no guidance nor precedence to the 
matter at bar. Appellee's Brief at 9-11. Cadleway asserts that Michelex was twice 
directed to appear before the district court prior to the entry of the Order and Judgment, 
while the garnishee in Pangea was never afforded a hearing. Id. Cadleway's argument 
again attempts to mislead this Court. The orders from the district court directing 
Michelex to appear were the Order to Show Cause and the Bench Warrant. Neither order 
provided notice that Michelex would be held liable for $803.031.31, or for any sum 
certain, which Michelex did not owe, nor was outstanding. The Order to Show Cause 
demanded that Michelex present and show cause why the following should not be 
granted: 
1. Michelex Corporation ("Michelex") should not be held in contempt for 
its failure to respond to the Writ of Garnishment issued by this Court and 
served upon it. 
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2. Michelex should not be ordered to pay the Plaintiff the Judgment entered 
against Defendant/Judgment Debtor Envelope Packaging of Utah, Inc. in 
favor of Plaintiff, or an amount that his Court deems just, including, but not 
limited to, all amounts Michelex owes to Defendant/ Judgment Debtor 
Envelope Packaging of Utah, Inc., up to the amount of the Judgment, and 
attorney fees and cost. 
(R. at 144-145). Nowhere in the Order to Show Cause is there a demand for a hearing for 
Michelex to defend its rights and dispute its liability for the $803,031.31, or any sum 
certain. Specifically, Michelex was ordered to show why it should not be ordered to pay 
%call amounts Michelex owes to" EPU. Michelex did not owe EPU anything. Not money. 
Not unpaid services. Michelex was not a partner nor held any ownership interest in EPU. 
Michelex owed EPU nothing. Cadleway's representation that Michelex was given notice 
that a judgment would be entered against it in substitution of EPU is overstated. Any 
order from the district court directing Michelex to pay Cadleway all Michelex owed to 
EPU was easily fulfilled, it simply had to pay nothing. Additionally, the OSC requested 
Michelex to appear and explain why it did not complete the Answers to the Garnishment 
Interrogatories. Because Michelex had diligently and timely complied with its obligations 
and provided Answers to the Garnishment Interrogatories, it did not need to address 
paragraph one of the OSC. 
The Bench Warrant that Cadleway asserts meets the due process standard 
included: 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICE IN THE STATE 
OF UTAH: 
A representative of Michelex Corporation failed to appear on 
September 23, 2008, in violation of the obligation to appear on a Court 
546108 1 O 
Order requiring him/her to appear on behalf of the Garnishee for a 
supplemental hearing. 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to arrest an officer or a 
representative of Michelex Corporation forthwith and bring him/her before 
this Court; or if the Court has adjourned, to deliver him to the custody of the 
Sheriff of the above-named County until the Court is next in session. 
Bail is set in the amount of $2,500.00 (CASH BAIL ONLY). The 
warrant is returnable on December 12, 2008 @ 9:15 S35 of the Garnishee is 
ordered to appear on said date at the Third District Court, 450 South State 
Street, Salt Lake city, UT 84111. 
(R. 157-158). The Bench Warrant failed to indicate or provide notice that Michelex 
appear before the district court and be prepared to present evidence refuting that it was 
liable for an award of $803,031.31, or any sum certain, to EPU or Cadleway. 
Neither hearing met the commitment the Utah Supreme Court made to the "right of 
a garnishee to be heard before being at risk of having a judgment entered against it" 
established in Remington Rand, Inc. v. O'Neil 309 P.2d 368 (1957) (Remington II). Li 
at 370. The Bench Warrant hearing began as a way for Cadleway to receive responses to 
certain Garnishee Interrogatories, which had already been prepared, notarized and mailed, 
and was converted into an unconstitutional takings hearing. 
Notwithstanding Cadleway's argument to the contrary, Pangea does provide 
instructive guidance on how to determine this matter. The Pangea court determined that a 
garnishee is entitled to a hearing before the garnishee can be found liable to a plaintiff 
and have a judgment entered against it. Pangea fflj 6 and 11. Pangea also emphasized a 
need for heightened sensitivity to due process where a plaintiff seeks to obtain a judgment 
from a garnishee, including a hearing before the garnishee can be found liable to a 
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plaintiff and have a judgment entered against it. Pangea f 6. The evidentiary hearing is 
in addition to the requirement that a judgment may not be taken against a garnishee who 
has not been served with a reply to the Garnishment Interrogatories. Pangea, f^ 10. The 
district court's refusal to set the Order and Judgment aside and hold an evidentiary 
hearing violated Michelex's due process. 
Cadleway also challenges Michelex's application to Abrogast Family Trust v. 
River Crossing. LLC. 2008 UT App 277, 191 P.3d 39. Abrogast was referenced in 
Appellant's Brief to set forth the standards and law declared by this Court that (1) the trial 
court has broad, but not unlimited discretion when determining to set aside default 
judgment under rule 60(b); and (2) that where there is reasonable justification or excuse 
for the defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is made to set it aside, and the 
district court refuses to vacate the default judgment, it is uniformly considered an abuse 
of discretion. Abrogast, % 23. Michelex did not referenced nor attempt to apply the facts 
of Abrogast to this appeal. 
Cadleway's contention that evidence was presented and the court determined to 
support the amount of the Order and Judgment of $803, 031.31 is also misleading. 
Appellee's Brief at 10. The information presented to the district court could not be 
considered evidence. Counsel presented information, which was inadmissible hearsay 
without proper foundation, to the district court to justify the entry of the Order and 
Judgment. The Hearing Transcript shows that counsel for Cadleway proffered 
information to the district court, referencing a deposition transcript of an EPU principal 
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claiming simply that "there was $775,000 owing." (R. at 338, p. 4:16-22. The 
implication being that Michelex Audio1 owed $775,000 to EPU. No additional 
information or any evidence regarding this general claim was presented. The district 
court accepted the implication of debt as evidence. Cadleway also proffered an exhibit, a 
"breakdown of the revenue that [allegedly] Michelex and En-Pack brought together,... 
this basic spreadsheet that Mr. Delgado [the deponent] prepared.5' (R. at 338, pp. 4:24-
5:2). The district court considered a basic spreadsheet, presumably prepared as a 
summary by the deponent, without any foundation, as evidence that a debt was owed by 
Michelex, not Michelex Audio. Cadleway also proffered documents printed from the 
internet that mention Michelex fka Highway One-OWEB, Inc., including an "8K" filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") dated July 23, 2003, IRS 
Employer I.D. No. 87-0636107, Commission File No. 0-26695. (R. at 261-270, 278-306, 
338 at 5-6). The documents were not only confusing but lacked foundation, relevance 
and were inadmissible hearsay. The district court erred in considering the documents as 
evidence demonstrating that Michelex was indebted to EPU or that EPU had a merger or 
partnership relationship with Michelex. Notwithstanding the less than compelling proffer 
by counsel, the district court stated, "I certainly think what we could probably do is issue 
an order granting judgment for the amount of money owed to be applied against whatever 
they owe Envelop Packaging." R. at 338, p.5:4-6, p.6:13-14). Cadleway, however, 
1
 There is no entity in existence known to me as "Michelex Audio Corporation of 
America." Thomas Gramuglia Affidavit, K 3. (R. a t 183) 
546108 1 11 
prepared the Order and Judgment stating that Michelex was liable for the amount of 
$803,032.31 without establishing Michelex did owe EPU that amount or had a 
partnership/ownership relationship with EPU, and the district court signed it. 
Michelex had no knowledge of Cadleway's claim of judgment against it and was 
provided no notice of what the actual issues were as the matter related to Michelex. Had 
Michelex attended the Bench Warrant hearing as ordered it would have prepared for a 
supplemental hearing to explain its alleged failure to respond to the Garnishment 
Interrogatories. Michelex would not have been prepared to present or controvert 
evidence of ownership or indebtedness of EPU. Michelex had no notice that an 
evidentiary-type hearing was to be held regarding any reported debt it owed to EPU, 
and/or its purported ownership interest in EPU. The district court erred and deprived 
Michelex its due process in denying the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment and refusing to 
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine if Michelex owed any debt to EPU and if there 
was a merger/partnership relationship between Michelex and EPU. 
Arguing in the alternative, if this Court determines Michelex failed to sufficiently 
preserve its deprivation of due process claim, Michelex claims the issue is preserved 
through an exception. An exception to the general rule, that claims not raised before the 
trial court may not be raised on appeal, is the "plain error" exception. State v. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, Yl 11 and 13, 10 P.3d 346. In Holgate, the Utah Supreme Court outlined an 
exception for constitutional questions of "plain error." Id. ^ 11-13. "The plain error 
exception enables the appellate court to 'balance the need for procedural regularity with 
546108 1 1 2 
the demands of fairness. At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit us to avoid 
injustice.'" Holgate, ^[13. (Internal citations omitted). The elements for the plain error 
are, 
(I) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious 1o the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or 
phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined. 
Holgate ^ 13. (Internal citations omitted). The plain error exception applies to the appeal 
at bar. First an error exists. The district court should have set aside the Order and 
Judgment and held an evidentiary hearing prior to the potential taking by Cadleway 
against Michelex and erred by not doing so. Second, the error should have been obvious 
to the district court. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 64D provides for such a hearing. 
Michelex, as a garnishee, enjoyed a heightened degree of due process as a neutral third-
party from whom a judgment is being sought, particularly as evidence was produced, in 
the form of the Answers to the Garnishment Interrogatories and affidavits, that Michelex 
was not a debtor to EPU nor had an ownership interest therein. 
Lastly, the error was harmful. Had the district court set aside 1he Order and 
Judgment and held an evidentiary hearing, a more reasonable outcome, lending more 
confidence to the district court's verdict, would have resulted. Based upon the sworn 
testimony provided by Michelex in the Answers to the Garnishment Interrogatories and 
the Gramuglia and Almasian Affidavits, a more favorable outcome for Michelex would 
have resulted. The sworn testimony clearly shows that Michelex was not a debtor to EPU 
546108 1 1-5 
nor had any relationship with EPU. Based upon the foregoing, this Court could 
reasonably apply the plain error exception to this matter. 
II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BECAUSE 
ITS DECISION SHOCKED ONE'S SENSE OF JUSTICE. 
Michelex is seeking that this Court reverse the August 12, 2009 Minute Entry 
denying Michelex's Motion to Set Aside Order and Judgment due to the district court's 
abuse of its discretion. Michelex met the requirements set forth in Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)2. 
While analyzing a motion to set aside, the district court should consider the following 
factors: (1) whether the motion filed by the movant is timely; (2) wether there is a basis 
for granting relief under any of the subsections of 60(b); and (3) whether the movant has a 
meritorious defense. See Menzies v. Galekta. 2006 UT 81,^65, 150 P.3d 480. 
Cadleway does not dispute that Michelex met the first and third requirements and argued 
only that Michelex failed to meet the second requirement, "whether there is a basis for 
granting relief under any of the subsections of 60(b)." See Appellee's Brief at 11, citing 
2
 Mistakes: inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On 
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party 
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which 
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new tril under Rule 59(b); 
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgement is void (5) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should hve been prospective 
judgment; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgement. UTAH R. 
Civ. P. 60(b). 
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Menzies v. Galekta. 2006 UT 81,1f 65, 150 P.3d 480. 
Cadleway argues that Michelex failed "to identify any particular ground under 
which it believed relief under rule 60(b) was appropriate." Appellee's Brief at 11. 
Curiously, a page later, Cadleway contradicts itself by claiming that Michelex argued 
Rule 60(b)(1), excusable neglect was applicable, but failed to argue before that Rule 
60(b)(6) applies. Appellee Brief at 12. Michelex argued to set aside the Order and 
Judgment based upon both subsection (1) and (6). It cannot be disputed Michelex's 
Motion and Reply Memorandum are singularly dedicated to setting forth the basis for the 
district court to set aside its Order and Judgment under Rule 60(b). Cadleway's assertions 
relative to 60(b) are curious. Michelex identifies Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure in the first sentence of its Motion. The remainder of the Motion sets forth 
argument, facts and law in support attempting to persuade the district court to set aside its 
Order and Judgment based upon mistake, excusable neglect, incompetent counsel and 
certain facts which meet the standard of "any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment." (R. at 211-217 and 307-313); see UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1) 
and (6). 
In its original Motion, Michelex's argument includes its diligence in timely and 
accurately preparing its Answers to the Garnishment Interrogatories (R. at 185), 
notarizing and mailing them (R. at 182), Michelex's New York attorney's unfamiliarity 
with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure concerning a Garnishee's continuing responsibilities 
after responding to the Garnishee Interrogatories and the proper response to the Order to 
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Show Cause and Bench Warrant when not a party to an action. (R. at 213). 
Michelex, in its Reply Memorandum also addresses how the facts of the matter 
meet Rule 60(b)(1). Michelex's Reply asserts that it had "timely answered the 
Garnishment Interrogatories through counsel, and based upon the repeated assurances of 
its said New York legal counsel Garnishee (a New York resident) mistakenly failed to 
respond to the pre-judgment notices served upon it prior to judgment." (R. at 308). 
Michelex's arguments, set forth in its Motion and Reply Memorandum, specifically and 
persuasively address the elements and factors of Rule 60(b)(1). Michelex presented that 
its counsel's actions relevant to the Answers to the Garnishment Interrogatories and 
notices of hearing qualified as excusable neglect. 
Michelex also presented argument to the district court under Subsection (6). 
Subsection (6) is the catch-all provision allowing the district court to address other 
evidence and considerations. Michelex stated that its Motion was made on the grounds 
that the "factual basis for the Judgment is false and inaccurate, Garnishee having 
heretofore fully [and timely] responded to the Writs of Garnishment and answered the 
interrogatories propounded to Garnishee under oath, evidencing that Garnishee owed no 
money or property to Plaintiff." (R. at 212). The proposal and argument that a court 
entered its judgment based upon false and inaccurate information and evidence 
sufficiently raises the issue of "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment." See Lund v. Brown. 2000 UT 75, % 9, 11 P.3d 277. Michelex included in its 
Motion, "the answers to the Interrogatories expressly state 'Michelex Corporation is not 
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indebted to either Defendant in either property or money.'" (R. at 213). Michelex 
included, referenced and presented, arguments based upon Gramuglia's and Almasian's 
Affidavits that Michelex was neither a debtor nor partner to EPU. (R. at 185-188 and 
212-213). Additionally, Michelex included its attempts to contact Cadleway's counsel to 
dispel Cadleway's confusion, misunderstanding and incorrect assumptions in the matter, 
prior to the entry of the district court's Minute Entry. (R. at 214-215). 
Michelex's Reply Memorandum also presented arguments, based on Rule 
60(b)(6), for the district court to consider to set aside its Order and Judgment. Michelex 
established the spurious nature of Cadleway's claims and actions to substitute Michelex 
as the judgment debtor, effectively taking a non-collectable judgment and making it 
collectable from an unrelated and independent third party to the underlying lawsuit, which 
owed no debt to, nor held any interest in, EPU. Michelex again referenced, provided and 
implemented, the timely, sworn, Answers to Garnishment Interrogatories and the 
supporting Affidavits of Gramuglia and Almasian. (R. at 307-309). Michelex argued 
that the Minute Entry is based upon erroneous facts and arguments by Cadleway. 
Additionally, Michelex's Reply addressed the inadmissible evidence proffered by 
Cadleway at the Bench Warrant hearing. Michelex identifies for the district court that the 
information printed from a website, 
does not of itself provide evidence either that the Garnishee owes money to 
the Judgment Debtor, Envelop Packaging of Utah, Inc., or that Envelop 
Packaging of Utah, Inc. has been merged into or acquired by Garnishee. At 
a very minimum, Garnishee should be entitled to confront those allegations 
clearly set forth, and not in the form of an Opposing Memorandum to 
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Garnishee's Motion to Set Aside an Order and Judgment. Garnishee has 
state under oath that Garnishee is not a debtor of Envelope Packaging of 
Utah, Inc. See Affidavit of Tom Gramuglia dated January 16, 2009, 
paragraph 9 and 10 and Exhibit A attached thereto. 
(R. at 310). 
It cannot be reasonably disputed that Michelex was seeking that the district court 
set aside the Order and Judgment, based upon evidence in its memoranda and pursuant to 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b). Moreover, it is telling that the district court included in its Minute 
Entry its consideration of Rule 60(b) both subsections (1) and (6). (R. at 322). Cadleway 
acknowledged that "the district court ruled that, under either subsection, Michelex had 
failed to supply a basis on which a court may set aside a judgment under Rule 60(b)." 
Appellee's Brief at 12. Cadleway acknowledged that the district court considered both 
subsections (1) and (6) in its Order and Judgment. 
Michelex properly and sufficiently raised how and why Rule 60(b), both 
subsections (1) and (6), should have been considered by the district court to set aside its 
Order and Judgment. The district court included in its Minute Entry its consideration of 
subsections (1) and (6). Michelex contends that the district court failed to consider all of 
the evidence, including Michelex's diligent response in answering and mailing its 
Answers to the Garnishment Interrogatories and reasonable belief that because it owed 
nothing to EPU nor had an ownership interest in EPU, Michelex need not act further 
relative to the matter. The district court only considered Michelex's failure to appear 
before the court as ordered through the OSC and Bench Warrant. The district court's 
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failure to consider all of the evidence, including an evidentiary hearing with Michelex, 
led to an absurd result, one that shocks one sense of justice. 
The result of the district court's actions meet the standard recently set forth by the 
Utah Supreme Court in reversing a district court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion, "A 
district court abuses its discretion only when its 'decision was against the logic of the 
circumstances and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one's sense of justice . . . 
[or] resulted from bias, prejudice, or malice." Jones v. Layton/Oakland, 2009 UT 39, f 
27, 214 P.3d 859 (quoting 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 632 (2007)). The district 
court's decision not to set aside its Order and Judgment and refusing an evidentiary 
hearing has a shocking result. The result is an unrelated, uninterested company, not a 
party to the original lawsuit, which did not owe EPU any money nor have an ownership 
interest in EPU, is held liable for $803,031.31, simply because it did not appear before a 
court located across the country. Michelex presented to Cadleway, prior to the court's 
signing of the Judgment and Order, and to the district court the following business day, 
the Answers to the Garnishment Interrogatories and the Gramuglia and Almasian 
Affidavits. Cadleway and the district court had timely sworn testimony stating clearly 
that Michelex was not a debtor of EPU (R. at 183 and 185), did not receive goods or 
services to Michelex for which EPU had not been fully compensated (R. at 183), nor was 
ever a partner with EPU. (R. at 183). Additionally, Mr. Gramuglia testified that he knew 
of no entity called Michelex Audio. (R. at 183). The district court ignored all this 
essential evidence. The district court's refusal to consider the stated and compelling 
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evidence prior to denying Michelex's Motion alone is shockingly enough to warrant 
reversing the Minute Entry and remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing. 
The district court's refusal to set aside its Order and Judgment and conduct an 
evidentiary hearing, where admissible evidence could be presented, and instead maintain 
such a considerable judgment against an unrelated, uninvolved and completely 
independent third-party, shocks one's sense of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Michelex requests that the district court's ruling on 
Michelex's Motion to Set Aside Order and Judgment against Garnishee Michelex and 
Michelex Audio Corporation of America, AKA Michelex, be reversed and the matter 
remanded with the direction that the district court hold an evidentiary hearing to 
determine: (1) if a debt is owed by Michelex to EPU; (2) if so, the amount; and (3) if 
there was at any relevant time a ownership/partnership relationship between Michelex and 
EPU. 
Alternatively, determine that the district court's judgment should also be reversed 
on the ground that the district court abused its discretion in denying Michelex's Motion to 
Set Aside Order and Judgment against Garnishee Michelex and Michelex Audio 
Corporation of America, aka Michelex. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Michelex respectfully requests oral argument because it will materially assist this 
Court in adjudicating the legal issues in this appeal. 
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Respectfully submitted this 11th day of August, 2010. 
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